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Abstract
Increasing uncertainty surrounding social security benefits and public sector pension plans is
pushing retirement savings into the spotlight. This study finds that education, financial discipline, and
financial sophistication increase the likelihood of participating in a pension or an IRA/Keogh plan.
Financial distress decreases the likelihood of setting aside additional funds in an IRA/Keogh plan.
Further, the likelihood that an eligible individual will decline an offered pension plan decreases with
education and financial discipline and financial sophistication. Controlling for health and marital
status, the choice to annuitize retirement assets decreases with age and the desire to take risk. © 2013
Academy of Financial Services. All rights reserved.
JEL classifications: D14 (Personal Finance); D91 (Intertemporal Consumer Choice: Life Cycle Models and
Saving); Gil (Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions)
Keywords: Retirement planning; Annuitization; Risk aversion; Behavioral finance
1. Introduction
The retirement picture in the United States has dramatically transformed over the past
two decades, with defined benefit (DB) plans replaced by defined contribution (DC) plans.
Even public sector plans are shifting to DC plans in response to state and local budget crises
(Cooper & Walsh, 2012). According to the Government Accountability Office (2011),
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between 1990 and 2008 the number of active participants in private sector DB plans fell by
27%, from 26 to 19 million. At the same time, the number of active participants in DC plans
increased by over 90%, from 35 to 67 million. The shift from DB to DC presents challenges
as, increasingly, retirees themselves must determine how much to save, and subsequently
how to spend down their retirement savings.
U.S. retirement assets totaled nearly $18 million in December 2011 (Investment Company
Institute, 2012, pp. 106-108). But the reality is that most households are not adequately
preparing for retirement. Only 66% of workers in the 2012 Retirement Confidence Survey
(EBRI) reported that they and/or their spouses have saved money for retirement. Sixty
percent of workers report that they and/or their spouses have less than $25,000 in total
savings and investments (excluding their home and DB plans); 30% have less than $1,000.
This article looks to tenants of behavioral finance such as bounded self-control and
byperbolic discounting to explain why households are not saving enough for retirement, and
considers tools that can inñuence saving behavior. The tools include using heuristics such as
savings rules and framing alternative choices in ways that will encourage saving. Logit
analysis identifies factors that are related to the likelihood of making retirement savings
choices. The study also considers one alternative for liquidating retirement assets (annuities)
and examines characteristics that impact the likelihood of purchasing them. The next section
contains a literature review, followed by a discussion of the data and descriptive statistics.
Then multivariate analyses are presented, followed by the summary and conclusions.
2. Behavioral finance theory and retirement saving and spending
2.1. Accumulating retirement assets
Understanding motivation to save is paramount in helping households make decisions that
will provide them funding for the best retirement possible. The life-cycle model assumes that
rational individuals are dissavers in their younger years, borrowing to meet consumption
needs. As they enter later stages of their life cycles, they eventually spend less than they
make, becoming savers. Finally, when they retire, they convert their savings to consumption
at a rate that will exhaust savings at death. The underlying assumption is that people are
well-informed and act rationally. They correctly estimate probabilities of future payoffs, and
use constant discount rates to maximize the utility of consumption over their lifetimes.
The fact that households have saved little for retirement is difficult to explain using
standard economic models. Behavioral finance provides insights into why actual behavior
may deviate from that of the rational economic agents forming the basis of economic theory.
The notions of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) and bounded self-control (Thaler and
Shefrin, 1981) provide that consumers do not want to trade consumption today for con-
sumption in the future. Though understanding the consequences of not saving, they find it
difficult to control consumption today. They have good intentions, but lack the self-control,
or financial discipline, to carry them out.
Another explanation for lack of saving provided by behavioral finance involves discount
rates. Rational individuals utilize constant discount rates over time, but some individuals are
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hyperbolic discounters (Laibson et al., 1998). Tbat is, tbey apply bigber discount rates to
tbe near term tban to the future. Tbey place a lower value on future benefits and overvalue
tbe present.
Individuals wbo realize tbese sbortcomings may employ beuristics to belp them save.
For example, tbey may use a saving mle, wbereby tbey save a set percentage of tbeir income
or dollar amount each period. Otbers may use bome ownership as a savings tool, which is,
getting into tbe habit of making a consistent monthly payment and investing in an asset.
Individuals wbo have been involved witb one type of savings behavior may be more likely
to save for retirement (Wameryd, 1999).
This study investigates bow tbe tools suggested by behavioral finance theory impact
households' decisions about baving a pension and setting aside additional retirement savings
in the form of an IRA/Keogh. Further, tbis study analyzes the factors that influence tbe
decision to decline participating in a pension plan if offered one.
2.2. Spending retirement assets
After accumulating savings, retirees must eventually convert tbeir assets to income to pay
expenses. Biases tbat individuals exhibit in retirement wealth accumulation may extend to
tbe wealth decumulation stage (Brown et al., 2008). Thus, behavioral finance theories can
also be applied to how retirees spend down retirement assets. Tbis study considers annuities,
wbicb are receiving renewed interest, as an option for retirees to convert their assets to an
income stream tbat will last tbeir lifetimes.
Traditionally, annuities have been tbe default option for DB plans and lump sum payments
tbe default for DC plans. Tbus, tbe shift from DB to DC retirement plans, and the subsequent
sbift in tbe default payment plans increasingly expose retirees to longevity risk, the risk tbat
tbey will outlive their assets. Wbile Social Security and DB plans provide longevity-insured
incomes streams, tbey represent only a portion of retirement resources for retirees witb
substantial savings. Retirees can reduce tbeir exposure to longevity risk by converting all or
a portion of tbeir retirement savings to annuities. Longevity annuities are receiving increased
attention, as tbey provide for income to begin later, for example, 15 years after retirement,
and so cost less tban immediate annuities providing similar monthly income. Retirees wbo
live to an old age can bave guaranteed income tbrougb tbeir final years.
Theoretical researcb has shown tbat witb actuarially fair annuity prices, retirees witb no
bequest motives sbould annuitize all retirement savings (Yaari, 1965; Davidoff et al., 2005).
Pooling tbe risk of outliving one's assets tbrougb annuities is more efficient than self-
insuring by saving enough to guarantee income tbrougb tbe end of one's life (Govemment
Accountability Office, 2011). Even so, very little annuitization is taking place (Scott, 2008).
Many studies have tried to resolve tbis annuity puzzle. Explanations include desires to leave
bequests, healtb status, marital status, illiquidity of annuities, a pooriy functioning market for
annuities because of adverse selection and bigb administrative and marketing costs, and bigb
fractions of wealth already annuitized by public pension plans.
Concluding that the literature bas failed to explain tbe annuity puzzle. Brown et al., (2008)
look to behavioral biases for answers, and provide a framing explanation for tbe puzzle. In
a consumption frame, annuities are viewed as insurance that reduces retirees' longevity risk.
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In an investment frame, annuities are viewed as risky assets wbose payoff depends upon an
event (deatb) at an uncertain time. If death comes sooner, tbe payoff is lower in terms of
fewer annuity payments; if deatb comes later, tbe payoff is bigber witb annuity payments
over a longer period. Tbey find tbat most individuals prefer an annuity wben presented in a
consumption frame, wbereas most prefer nonannuitized products wben presented in an
investment frame.
Hurd et al. (2004) examine tbe decision about whetber to take reduced Social Security
benefits at age 62 (early) rather tban delay taking tbe benefits; delaying application for
claiming benefits is equivalent to purchasing additional Social Security annuities. Tbe vast
majority of workers claim as soon as tbey are eligible. Tbe study finds weak evidence that
more educated retirees delay claiming. Tbey conjecture tbat individuals witb bigb level of
education better understand tbe decision to annuitize and its impact on future payouts.
Tbis study examines factors tbat impact tbe probability that a household will cboose to
convert retirement savings to annuity payouts. Proxies for mortality risk, understanding
longevity risk and tbe desire to leave a bequest are hypothesized to impact a bousebold's
conversion choice.
3. Survey data
All variables useii in tbis study are derived from tbe 2007 Federal Reserve Board Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF; Federal Reserve Board, 2007).' The purpose of the SCF is to
provide a comprehensive view of tbe financial behavior of a cross-section of U.S. bouse-
bolds. Detailed information is gathered on tbe housebold's retirement plans and saving
bebavior, as well as demograpbic cbaracteristics such as bome ownersbip, age, education,
income, and health. Attitudes about financial risk and leaving an inheritance are also
measured.
A distinguishing factor of tbe SCF is its sample design.^ To obtain more detail on the
financial bebavior of tbose households bolding a disproportionate share of tbe wealtb, tbe
SCF combines two sampling tecbniques (Aizcorbe, Kennickell, & Moore, 2003). Approxi-
mately two-tbirds of tbe respondents included in tbe final public dataset are randomly
selected bouseholds from across tbe United States; the remaining one-third are wealtby
bousebolds selected from a list derived from tax return data. Wbile tbis sampling design
prohibits tbe use of tbe sample as representative of tbe U.S. population, inferences can be
made about tbe relationships among variables within bouseholds.
Descriptive statistics for the sample are provided in Table 1. Over balf of tbe bouseholds
in tbe sample (57%) bave some type of pension plan or are receiving a pension benefit wbile
43% bave an IRA or Keogb type account. Of tbe bousebold beads offered tbe opportunity
and are eligible to participate in a pension plan on tbeir current job, 12% declined to
participate. Over 40% of bouseholds participating in a retirement plan on a current job, and
who have options about bow to receive benefits, chose to receive a lifetime annuity for tbeir
benefit payout.
Tbe median age of tbe head of bousebold is 51 years, witb a median bousebold income
of $70,000. Nearly 68% of bousebolds consist of couples who are married or living as
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Table 1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Dependent variables Definition Descriptive statistics
Pension
IRA/Keogh
Decline
Choose annuity
Household has a pension plan; includes a defined benefit or
defined contribution plan with a current job, cuffently receiving
a pension benefit, expects to receive a pension benefit from
previous jobs, has an IRA-SEP/Simple account for self-
employed or small businesses; does not take into consideration
whether the household has an extra IRA or Keogh type account.
n = 4,418
Household has an IRA or Keogh type account; includes Roth
accounts, regular IRAs, a rolled-over account into an IRA from
a previous job; this variable is capturing those households who
have "extra" retirement money set aside on top of current
pension plans.
n = 4,418
Household head declines the opportunity to participate in a
pension plan on a current job, when eligible to participate and
made the offer; excludes respondents who are not currently
working for pay, are not eligible to participate, are not offered
the opportunity, or are self-employed or in a partnership such as
a medical practice.
n = 1,760
Household head chooses to receive a lifetime annuity for expected
benefit payout; includes only those households who are
paiticipating in a retirement plan on a current job and have a
choice as to how they can receive benefits.
n = 987
Sample proportion:
0.571
Sample proportion:
0.431
Sample proportion:
0.124
Sample proportion:
0.408
Control variables Definition Descriptive statistics
Age
Income
Married
Age of household head
Total gross income received by the household in 2006 from all
sources, including withdrawals from IRAs and pension
accounts; in SOOOs
Household consists of a married couple or two persons living as
partners
Mean = 52 years
Median = 51 years
Median = $70.00
Sample proportion:
0.675
Explanatory variables Definition Descriptive statistics
Education level
No HS diploma
HS diploma
Some college
College degree
Graduate degree
Financial discipline
Saving rule
Homeowner
Financial distress
Highest level of education eamed by household head
No high school diploma
High school diploma or GED
Attended college, but a degree not eamed
Eamed a college degree
Eamed a graduate degree
Household has consistent plan for saving income
Household owns home
Household has used a "payday loan" in the past year, or has been
1+ months behind in loan payments in the past year, or has
filed bankruptcy
Sample proportion:
0.099
0.258
0.158
0.274
0.211
Sample proportion:
0.530
0.742
0.218
Continued
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Table 1 (Continued)
Explanatory variables Definition Descriptive statistics
Percent stock Percent of financial assets invested in stock
Risk aversion Household attitude about the amount of financial dsk they are
willing to take when saving or making investments
High risk Take substantial risks expecting to earn substantial returns
More risk Take above-average risks expecting to earn above-average returns
Avg. dsk Take average risks expecting to earn average returns
No dsk Not willing to take any dsks
Estate Household feels it is very important or important to leave an estate
or inheritance to their surviving heirs
n = 987
Health dsk Household head reports health status that is poor or fair, rather
than excellent or good.
n = 987
Mean = 31.5%
Median = 22.4%
Sample proportion:
0.052
0.214
0.422
0.312
Sample proportion:
0.581
Sample proportion:
0.093
financially interdependent partners. Over a third of the household heads in the sample have
a high school education or less; 27% have a college degree and over 20% have a graduate
degree. Three quarters of the sample households own a home. Over 50% of the households
report that they have a regular savings plan. Examples include setting money aside each
month or spending the income of one family member, while saving all other income.
One-fifth of the households report financial distress or difficulties, measured as using a
"payday loan" or getting behind two or more months in loan payments in the past year, or
filing bankruptcy. The median of households' financial wealth held in stock (either directly,
through mutual funds, or in retirement accounts) is 22%.
In terms of attitude toward financial risk, only five percent of the households are willing
to take substantial risk to earn substantial returns. Twenty-one percent are willing to take
above average risk. The most common attitude toward risk, those willing to take aver-
age risk, comprise 42% while almost a third of the sample (31%) are not willing to take any
risks.
For the subsample of households who were eligible but declined an offered pension plan,
nearly 60% feel that it is very important or important to leave an inheritance. Further-
more, just nine percent of these household heads report that their health status is poor or only
fair.
4. Analysis
A logistic regression is used to estimate the impact of these characteristics on the
household's retirement savings behavior, holding other factors constant. The model assumes
that the respondent's choices are characterized by a logistic distribution, and the maximum
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likelihood estimates of the regression coefficients yield an estimated probability derived from
tbe cumulative logistic distribution function.
The odds ratio is the probability that an event occurs divided by the probability that it does
not occur. In the logit model, the log of the odds is linear:
log [Pr Event / (1 - Pr Event)] = a + S ßkX^
The explanatory variables that are hypothesized to infiuence the respondent's decisions are
denoted by x ,^ and the regression coefficients from the model are denoted by ß^- Tbe
estimate of the odds ratio (derived from taking the exponential of the maximum likelihood
estimates, ß^) indicates the impact that a unit change in x,^  has on the probability of an event,
holding all other factors constant. An odds ratio of 1.00 indicates equal odds, meaning the
explanatory variable has no significant impact on the event probability.^
For the indicator variables, the odds ratio estimate denotes the marginal effect on the
probability that the household will decide for (in favor of) the event when the variable is
"turned on," that is, takes the value 1 relative to the value 0. For the continuous variables,
the odds ratio estimate indicates the marginal impact on the probability that the household
will decide for the event given a one year change in age or a $1,000 change in annual income.
The first estimated models examine factors that impact the likelihood that a household will
Table 2 Results of logistic regression on pension and IRA/Keogh
Explanatory
variable
Intercept
Age
Age squaredt
Incomet
Married
Education
No diploma
High school
Some college
Grad degree
Homeowner
Saving rule
Percent stock
Financial distress
Odds ratio
Point
estimate
0.12*
1.06*
1.00*
1.00*
1.25*
0.41*
0.79*
0.93
1.02
1.59*
1.61*
1.01*
1.16
estimates (pension)
95% Confidence
interval estimate
0.06-0.22
1.04-1.09
1.00-1.00
1.00-1.00
1.08-1.45
0.32-0.53
0.66-0.95
0.76-1.14
0.84-1.23
1.34-1.90
1.41-1.84
1.01-1.01
0.99-1.37
/i-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.012
0.480
0.874
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.067
Odds ratio estimates (IRA/Keogh)
Point
estimate
0.01*
1.12*
1.00*
1.00
1.45*
0.19*
0.37*
0.56*
1.40*
2.06*
1.47*
1.02*
0.60*
95% Confidence
interval estimate
0.00-0.02
1.08-1.15
1.00-1.00
1.00-1.00
1.22-1.72
0.13-0.27
0.31-0.46
0.45-0.70
1.14-1.71
1.65-2.57
1.26-1.71
1.02-1.02
0.49-0.74
p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.583
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
n = 4,418.
*Odds ratio estimate differs from 1.00 at a 5% significance level.
tFor both models, the odds ratio estimate for Age squared is significantly less than one, but only to the fourth
decimal place, that is, a minute nonlinear effect. The odds ratio estimate for Income in the Pension model is
similar, indicating a minute negative impact on the likelihood.
The p-value is the observed level of significance for the maximum likelihood estimates of the regression
coefficients, ß^.
In both equations, the x^ statistics for the likelihood ratio tests in each of the five imputations are significant
at less than the 1% level.
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bave a pension plan (left panel) or an IRA/Keogb (right panel). Tbe results are presented in
Table 2 and are interpreted as follows.
Tbe results indicate tbat, as expected, tbe age of an individual bas a significantly positive
effect on tbe probability of baving a pension. Tbe odds ratio indicates tbat for eacb year
older, tbe probability tbat a household bas a pension plan increases by six percentage points.
As individuals age, tbey become more cognizant of the need for retirement saving. Tbe
nonlinear age effect is exbibited by tbe odds ratio for age squared, witb tbe likelihood of
baving a pension increasing at a decreasing rate. As compared witb single bousebolds,
couples are 25% more likely to have a pension. Because bousebold income is beld constant,
tbis result may simply be because of tbe presence of another individual witb an additional
opportunity to participate in a pension plan.
Tbe level of education acbieved by tbe bousebold bead bas a significant, expected impact.
Compared witb respondents with a college degree, those witb less education are much less
likely to have a pension, even wben controlling for income. Tbose wbo bave no bigb school
diploma are 59% less likely, and tbose with just a bigb scbool diploma are 21% less likely.
One possible explanation is tbat tbose witb college or graduate degrees may have profes-
sional occupations tbat provide for a pension plan. In addition, tbose with more education
may better understand tbe necessity of saving for retirement.
Homeownersbip bas a significant positive impact on the bousebold's decision to partic-
ipate in a pension plan; homeowners are 59% more likely to bave a pension tban tbose wbo
do not own a bome. Tbis result supports Wameryd's notion tbat saving tbrougb buying a
home increases tbe likelihood of saving for otber purposes such as retirement. Households
wbo bave a consistent saving rule for bousebold income are 61% more likely to bave a
pension. A saving mle represents a commitment mechanism tbat can belp individuals
overcome the bounded self-control theorized by behavioral finance. Using a saving mle can
belp households to better save for retirement.
Several studies (Dow, 2009; Sbum & Faig, 2006) have sbown tbat bousebold financial
decisions are related to tbe financial sophistication of tbe decision-maker. Tbe percentage of
financial assets beld in stock is one measure of financial sophistication. Tbe odds ratio
indicates tbat tbe bigber tbe percentage of financial assets beld in stock, tbe more likely tbe
bousebold is to bave a pension. Individuals wbo understand tbe trade-off between risk and
return to tbe extent of increasing tbeir stock boldings to eam a bigber expected retum are
more likely to take action in saving for retirement."*
Evidence of financial distress is expected to have a negative impact on tbe probability of
participating in a pension plan. Households wbo live "paycbeck to paycbeck" or fall bebind
in loan payments are not as likely to have funds withheld for a pension plan. However, with
bousebold income beld constant, tbe financial distress variable is insignificant.
Tbe point estimate of tbe odds ratio for Income is 1.00 but weakly significant, indicating
tbat a change in income has very slight negative impact on tbe probability tbat tbe bousebold
will bave a pension. When otber bousehold characteristics are beld constant, tbe level of
income is not a driving factor in determining wbo will have a pension plan.^
Tbe second logit model examines tbose factors tbat impact tbe probability tbat a bouse-
hold decides to set extra retirement money aside in tbe form of IRA/Keogb plans. The results
reveal a significant positive relationsbip between tbe age of tbe bousebold bead and tbe
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probability of an IRA/Keogb plan. The odds ratio indicates that for each year older, tbe
probability tbat the household has an IRA/Keogb plan increases by 12 percentage points. As
individuals age, tbey likely feel a greater sense of urgency to save for retirement, and thereby
open and begin contributing to IRA/Keogb accounts. As witb tbe pension model, tbe
significant odds ratio estimate for age squared sbows a minute nonlinear age effect.
Tbe marital status of a bousehold has a strong, significant impact on tbe probability of
setting additional funds aside for retirement. Holding income and age constant, couples are
45% more likely to bave an IRA/Keogb plan than single households. Tbis could indicate
more proactive planning tbat accompanies a common vision for retirement lifestyle.
Tbe education level acbieved by tbe bead of housebold bas a strong, significant impact on
tbe probability of having an IRA/Keogb plan. Tbose witb no bigb school diploma, or just a
diploma, are 81% and 63%, respectively, less likely to have sucb a plan tban tbose witb a
college degree. To the contrary, bouseholds wbose head bas a graduate degree are 40% more
likely to have an IRA/Keogb. Again, tbose with higber education may have a better
understanding of tbe necessity to save for retirement to maintain tbe accustomed lifestyle.
Homeowners are 106% more likely to bave an IRA/Keogb, furtber supporting Warneryd's
notion that the discipline of building home equity through a monthly mortgage payment
increases tbe likelibood of saving for otber purposes sucb as retirement. Similarly, house-
holds who bave a consistent saving rule are 47% more likely to bave an IRA/Keogh. Wben
otber bousebold cbaracteristics are held constant, tbe level of income is not a driving factor
in determining who will have an IRA/Keogb.
As in the pension model, a financial portfolio witb a larger stock component (indicating
greater financial sophistication) increases tbe probability tbat tbe bousebold will bave an
IRA/Keogb plan. This probability increases by two percent for a one percent increase in tbe
stock portion of tbe portfolio.
Evidence of financial distress is also significant. Even bolding income constant, bouse-
bolds wbo bave experienced financial difficulties are 40% less likely to bave saved additional
funds for retirement.
Tbe 2012 Retirement Confidence Survey, referenced earlier, indicates that housebold
retirement savings are woefully inadequate. In light of tbe need to save more, it is prudent
to enroll in a pension plan wbenever possible, but some workers decline to participate. Tbe
next model examines those factors tbat determine tbe probability tbat a bousebold declines
to participate in a pension plan for wbicb they are eligible. Table 3 provides these logit
results.
Age of bead of bousehold is negatively related to tbe probability tbat a pension plan will
be declined. The odds ratio indicates tbat for each year older, the probability that tbe
bousebold declines a pension plan decreases by 14%. As individuals age and draw closer to
retirement, tbey must be more aware of tbe urgency of saving for retirement. Tbe point
estimate of the odds ratio for income is 1.00, and insignificant. Thus, when other bousebold
characteristics are beld constant, tbe level of income is not a dominant factor in determining
wbo will decline participating in a pension plan. Tbe marital status of tbe housebold is also
insignificant.
Controlling for income, and so the wherewithal to contribute, tbe level of education has
a significant impact on tbe probability of declining a pension plan. The odds ratio estimate
182 D.K. Schooley, D.D. Worden /Financial Services Review 22 (2013) 173-186
Table 3 Results of logistic regression on decision to decline pension plan
Explanatory
variable
Intercept
Age
Age squaredt
Income
Married
Education
No diploma
High school
Some college
Grad degree
Homeowner
Saving rule
Percent stock
Einancial distress
Odds ratio estimates
Point
estimate
13.30*
0.86*
1.00*
LOO
0.89
2.22*
1.75*
1.33
0.79
0.51*
0.73*
0.98*
1.06
95% Confidence
interval estimate
2.80-63.15
0.80-0.92
1.00-1.00
1.00-1.00
0.63-1.26
1.10-4.50
1.13-2.70
0.84-2.10
0.46-1.35
0.34-0.76
0.53-1.00
0.98-0.99
0.73-1.55
/3-value
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.192
0.513
0.027
0.012
0.220
0.386
0.001
0.048
0.000
0.744
n = 1,760.
*Odds ratio estimate differs from 1.00 at a 5% significance level.
tThe odds ratio estimate for Age squared is significantly greater than one, but only to the fourth decimal place,
that is, a minute nonlinear effect.
The p-value is the observed level of significance for the maximum likelihood estimates of the regression
coefficients, ßi^ .
The ) ^ statistics for the likelihood ratio tests in each of the five imputations are significant at less than the 1%
level.
indicates tbat, compared with respondents with a college degree, those with a higb school
degree are 75% more likely to decline a pension plan wbile those with no diploma are 122%
more likely to decline a pension plan. Tbose witb more education may better understand the
benefits of enrolling in a pension plan, especially wben the employer matches contributions.
The impact of financial discipline is significant in this model. Homeowners are 49% less
likely to decline a pension plan than those who do not own a bome. Furthermore, households
witb some sort of savings rule are 27% less likely to decline a pension plan. Households wbo
use tools to overcome bounds on tbeir self-control save ratber than spend (in this case,
througb pensions). Financial sophistication also plays a role in the likelihood of declining a
pension plan. A one percentage point increase in tbe stock composition of tbe portfolio leads
to a two percent decrease in the probability of declining a pension plan. Again, tbose wbo
are more financially sophisticated are more aware of the benefits of contributing towards
retirement savings. Contrary to expectations, financial distress does not significantly impact
tbe likelibood tbat a bousehold will decline a pension plan.
The final model estimates the impact of various factors on whether, given a choice, a
bousehold will choose an annuity benefit payout. The households examined here include
only those wbo are currently employed or are temporarily not working (e.g., laid off, on
maternity leave); retirees are excluded from the analysis. The age and health status of the
household bead are included to measure mortality risk. Tbe probability tbat a bousehold
chooses an annuity payout significantly decreases with age. For each year older, the
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Table 4 Results of logistic regression on decision to choose an annuity benefit payout
Explanatory vadable
Intercept
Age
Married
Education
No diploma
High school
Some college
Grad degree
Risk aversion
High dsk
More dsk
No dsk
Estate
Health dsk
Odds ratio estimates
Point
estimate
1.79
0.99*
0.71
1.81
1.04
1.06
0.91
0.39*
0.85
1.51
1.16
0.77
95% Confidence
interval estimate
0.90-3.57
0.97-1.00
0.46-1.10
0.75^.39
0.68-1.59
0.66-1.72
0.62-1.33
0.20-0.76
0.62-1.17
0.95-2.39
0.89-1.52
0.47-1.25
p-value
0.099
0.023
0.122
0.187
0.870
0.808
0.612
0.006
0.323
0.080
0.270
0.285
n = 987.
*Odds ratio estimate differs from 1.00 at a 5% significance level.
The p-value is the observed level of significance for the maximum likelihood estimates of the regression
coefficients, ß,;.
The x^ statistics for the likelihood ratio tests in each of the five imputations are significant at less than the 1%
level.
probability of choosing an annuity payout is one percent lower. With health status constant,
as individuals age their longevity risk decreases (they are less likely to outlive their assets)
and so they have less incentive to purchase an annuity. As found in previous studies (Brown,
2001; Rosen & Wu, 2004), health status was expected to impact the likelihood of choosing
an annuity. However, the results do not support that those in poor or fair health are less likely
to choose an annuity.
Couples can substitute some of the risk reducing effects of purchasing annuities through
intrafamily mortality risk-sharing. As explained by Hu and Scott (2007), " . . . a husband and
wife can implicitly insure each other by forming their own mortality pool of two persons."
Annuity demand should be lower for couples than for single households (Brown, 2007).
However, the results do not support that marital status impacts the likelihood of choosing an
annuity. When controlling for other factors, education does not have a significant impact on
the selection of annuity payout. While Hurd et al. find weak evidence, we find no evidence
to support the notion that education and the decision to annuitize are related.
The results for the risk aversion variable refiect that the sample of households view
annuities in a consumption frame. That is, annuities are insurance that reduce risk; longevity
risk, not investment risk. Compared with those who are willing to take average risk, those
who are willing to take high risk are 61% less likely to choose an annuity. Interestingly, when
marital status is not included in the model, those who are not willing to take any risk are 57%
more likely to choose an annuity. Both marital status and the risk aversion measures are
controlling for risk.
Finally, because annuities generally provide limited survivorship benefits, those desiring
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to leave an estate would be less likely to choose an annuity. However, the desire to leave an
estate is not significantly related to the probability of choosing an annuity payout.
5. Summary and conclusions
U.S. citizens are retiring in record numbers. The oldest baby boomers began retiring four
years ago and millions are set to join them over the next 15 years. However, statistics show
that Americans are not saving enough for retirement, especially in light of the tenuous
position of future social security benefits and reforms of public pension plans. Traditional
economic theory, which assumes rational economic agents with perfect foresight and con-
stant discount rates, falls short in explaining why people are not saving enough. Behavioral
finance theory may offer a better explanation, and suggest tools that may induce households
to save more for retirement.
For example, households can use some type of heuristic, such as a rule of thumb, to
impose financial discipline. This study finds that indicators of financial discipline, such as
saving rules and home ownership, increase the likelihood that a household member will have
a pension plan or IRA/Keogh, and decrease the likelihood that the head of household will
tum down participating in a pension plan.
The power of education as a means for increasing retirement saving is compelling, and this
study provides further evidence. Results of this study indicate that education is a major
determinant in retirement saving decisions. Even while holding age and income constant, the
more educated the head of household, the higher the probability that a household member
will have a pension or IRA/Keogh. In addition, those with more education are less likely to
turn down participation in a pension plan.
Public sector union officials, including those in San Diego and San lose who have most
recently seen a hit to pension plans, recognize that they must educate the public about
pensions and deferred compensation to help public workers understand how much they
will have to save to support themselves in retirement (Cooper and Walsh, 2012). Future
San Diego employees will likely enroll in DC plans, rather than the DB plans that have been
commonplace for public sector employees. More public sector employees are likely to
experience this shift as state and local governments seek more fiexibility in solving budget
problems.
The shift from DB to DC plans in both the private and public sectors, and the resulting
shift in payout from annuities to lump sums, call loudly for increased education about saving
and subsequently spending down retirement assets. Tbe danger that retirees will outlive their
savings is of major concern, as life expectancy and health care costs are increasing while
financial markets and home equity are declining.
While retirees can convert retirement assets to annuities, they shy away from them for
many reasons, including their bad reputation for high up-front costs and annual fees as well
as their poor performance as investment vehicles. Framing annuities as insurance against
longevity risk, rather than as an investment, may make them a more attractive option for
retirees. Survey evidence suggests that retirees holding annuities are more satisfied with their
retirement (Panis, 2004).
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Concem over Americans' retirement security prompted the Treasury Department to
propose new regulations intended to improve access to lifetime income options (U.S.
Treasury Department, 2012). Tbe regulations make it simpler and easier for employers to
offer retirees tbe option to split retirement benefits between a lump sum payout atid an
annuity. Furtber, tbe proposed reductions in regulatory barriers will open up tbe 401(k) and
IRA market to longevity annuities by giving partial relief from minimum distribution
requirements and by clarifying plan qualification mies. Tbese new mlings will facilitate
employers' ability to work witb annuity providers to offer employees a broader range of
cboices as to bow to receive and spend retirement assets. As a bigher percentage of tbe U.S.
population reaches retirement age, tbe number of competitive annuities offered could
increase, witb particular focus on longevity annuities.
Improved financial literacy is needed so tbat workers better understand tbeir options for
managing retirement income, and bow to evaluate financial risk, for example, longevity risk,
investment risk, interest rate risk. Tbe focus of education bas typically been on saving for
retirement, but employers and govemment must broaden education wbile workers are in the
saving plan, to include spending options tbat ensure tbat retirees bave income to last a
lifetime.
Notes
1 Tbe data are available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2007/scf2007
data.btml.
2 Tbe SCF also differs in its treatment of nonresponses. Tbe metbod of multiple
imputation replaces each missing value witb a set of values tbat represent a distribu-
tion of possibilities. This metbod attempts to simulate the distribution of missing data
and provide a more realistic measure of tbe variability around tbe unknown data tban
simpler methods of estimating missing values. Models are used to impute five alter-
native values for eacb missing value. Tbe final database consists of five complete
observations for eacb respondent, wbicb are combined for the analysis (Rubin, 1987;
Kennickell, 1991).
3 The confidence interval estimate of the odds ratio (derived from the parameter
estimates and tbeir covariance matrix) indicates whether tbe explanatory variable has
a significant impact at tbe 95% level of confidence. If tbe value 1.00 is within tbe
interval, tben tbe estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero and tbe
explanatory variable bas no statistically significant impact on tbe event probability.
4 Tbe literature suggests tbat another measure of financial sophistication is that the
bousebold seeks investment advice from a banker, accountant, financial planner, or
broker. A variable for seeking such professional advice is not significant in any of tbe
models and does not change tbe results.
5 Some portfolio allocation studies include a measure of financial wealth or networtb as
a control variable. Adding tbis measure to tbe analysis does not change tbe results in
any of tbe estimated models and tbe variable is insignificant.
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